

## Mikhail Gorbachev's summit news conference

*Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, held a news conference on June 1 for Soviet and foreign journalists covering the Soviet-American summit in Moscow. He made the following statement:*

OUR delegation that took part in the talks is present here, with the exception of Andrei Gromyko. We are at your disposal.

But apparently in accordance with tradition I should say a few words as to how we assess the results of the meeting.

The fourth meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States in three years has ended. This is not just arithmetics. I believe this is a statement full of meaning and big political importance.

Four meetings in three years. This characterises the intensity of the political dialogue, the level of our relations. And I think that already by itself this is very meaningful.

It is only natural that in the whole world, first of all in the Soviet Union and the United States, and evidently among you journalists there arises the question — what has the Moscow summit produced, where has it led to? Has it added anything new to the previous meetings?

I will begin by saying that we all, and I am convinced of this, were participants in a major event. The meeting has really demonstrated again the importance of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, confirmed once again the correctness of the choice of road in Geneva two and a half years ago. By way of Reykjavik and Washington we came to Moscow. This is a unique process in post-war history.

It is important that this is realised by all — both politicians and the public which is displaying a big interest in how relations between our countries are shaping up.

In the three years of my stay in the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee I have had more than two hundred meetings of an international character. I do not recall virtually a single meeting with friends from socialist countries, with representatives of capitalist and non-aligned countries at which an interest would not have been expressed and emphasised in seeing Soviet-American relations directed into a normal, healthy channel.

Such is the reality that is determined by the weight of our countries.

Yet, why has such an intensive dialogue, a process of immense importance, become possible?

I think it is thanks to realism. I mean realism in the policy both of the Soviet Union and of the United States, for the manifestation of this

approach by one side alone would not guarantee the possibility of such a process.

I don't want to engage in guesswork as to where confrontation would lead us if it continued, if the Kremlin and the White House lacked the timely resolve to turn the steering wheel in the right direction — from confrontation to the search for areas and spheres of co-operation, to the build-up of a political dialogue.

When the realities became clear, we started a dialogue accompanied by negotiations, and these negotiations, in turn, brought about agreements.

The relations that had harboured a dreadful threat to the entire world, to the very existence of mankind started to change. The two most powerful nations began reforming their relationship in their own interests and the interests of the international community.

That was a hard thing to do. A few minutes ago I mentioned that when the President and I exchanged the instruments of ratification.

Things are not easy, but on the whole an important, productive and positive process is under way.

Each of the four meetings was both a difficult and fruitful search for the balance of interests, each stepped up the efforts for finding solutions to major problems of universal human importance.

To illustrate the point, I will remind you of Reykjavik, the Reykjavik drama. This is but one example of how hard, sometimes dramatically so, the political dialogue between the two world powers is evolving.

What are the results of the fourth summit? The principal outcome is that the dialogue has been continued, now encompassing all vital issues of international politics and bilateral relations. The Moscow meeting has shown again that the dialogue has come to deal with real politics.

I will not say that our meetings got rid of propaganda moves, démarches and attempts to score points through propaganda manoeuvring. Nevertheless, these meetings are increasingly characterised by the striving, desire to make real politics. I'm convinced that this is a correct path, it is precisely in this way that we should act.

When in Washington, at the very first meeting, we felt an attempt at coaching us, we declined this approach and said that we had arrived to engage in real politics. We acted in the same way at this, fourth summit.

That is why it is characterised by deep-going, at times keen debate, up to the last minute of negotiations, not at the table, but when we already stood up — "wall against wall", as we say in Russia.

I would like to emphasise once again the idea of continuity that prevailed throughout the atmosphere of the meetings. You will find that in the final document. I regard it as a large-scale document. It embraces the idea that the dialogue, our fourth summit lays the bricks into the building of our future relations, and launches movement to continue in the 21st century.

What specifically has been accomplished? Following the political dialogue which I place highest, we have completed the process of agreeing on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Preparations for the fourth meeting pushed on that process, and we were able to exchange the instruments of ratification. This was not merely a formal act. I'll permit myself to use the following solemn phrasing: the completion of the procedures for putting into effect the INF Treaty has made the Moscow meeting a landmark event in Soviet-American dialogue, and in world politics as well.

Not only the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States but also their allies, the entire world public, the entire world community can congratulate themselves. This is a joint victory of reason and realism. It has become possible because today on all continents, in all countries irrespective of their social choice and other values which each people choose and determine itself, there is a common understanding that the world has found itself at a line where one must stop, when it is necessary to open the road in other directions — the direction towards a nuclear-free, non-violent world, towards an improvement of international relations.

Many are those who have made a real, substantial contribution to the attainment of this major victory. I must also note the role of the press. When it put difficult questions to politicians and to the participants in the talks this too was a necessary contribution because the questions put by journalists helped to raise the talks to the level at which they were concrete and convincing, helped to find solutions and arguments, helped to work out the forms of verification. So I consider it my duty to note the press as well.

It is now a matter of honour, first of all for the Soviet Union and the United States, and not only for them but for other states as well, for every letter and comma of the treaty to be observed and implemented.

Further I must say that the President and I have approved a joint statement. As I have already said, it sums up what has been accomplished after the Washington meeting and what was done here, in Moscow. At the same time the statement confirms a sort of agenda for the Soviet-American dialogue in future. In short, this is an important political document heralding a whole stage in our relations. The most substantial are the provisions relating to the importance of continuing and building up the political dialogue between countries and intensifying talks.

I would note the advance also in the sphere of disarmament. This is a very difficult process, especially concerning the question of strategic offensive arms. This, it appears, is the most complex task which we have encountered in post-war world politics. But I must firmly state that step by step we are advancing towards the treaty on the reduction of these weapons. Today one of the correspondents, maybe of those present here, asked whether after the talks held here I would retain my optimism concerning the conclusion of this treaty already this year, already during the present administration. I can say that if work is

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conducted effectively, if the present administration, if both sides act effectively, we can achieve the treaty.

I want to draw attention to our initiative, that has gained much ground, concerning talks on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe. It was published and I will not be repetitive. Now if something has to be specified, you are free to ask questions.

A whole package of agreements concerning bilateral relations between our countries has been signed. They too have been published.

There was an indepth discussion of the problem of regional conflicts. It was present at all our conversations with the President and at two plenary meetings. It was discussed with particular detail and thoroughness today.

I think that we have come to face a situation when it is possible to state that there have emerged in the world's "flash points" real chances for resolving regional problems and untangling these tight "knots" on the basis of political approaches, on the basis of the balance of interests.

As a matter of fact, we today stated the following: firstly, there is Afghanistan, and I will say about that later on. Secondly, there is a process concerning the Middle East. It is proceeding, positions are drawing closer and there is growing understanding of the need for its solution along the lines of an international conference. This has already been recognised. But the point at issue is how to regard this conference. All these issues will be specified in the course of future efforts.

There is the Kampuchean problem. Thanks to the initiative recently displayed by Vietnam and Kampuchea, it is being moved onto the plane when it can be resolved in the nearest future.

A real process is under way, and there is a possibility of solutions, in Central America, in southern Africa, and so on.

If some view my considerations as unjustified optimism, as an attempt at wishful thinking, I think, they are wrong. Let us compare the situation three to four years ago and today. The situation has substantially changed. There have emerged chances for a political solution of all these conflicts. Formidable forces have been set in motion in these regions and in the world as a whole. I have already stressed in conversations with the President and all American officials the principal idea — we should not lose, pass up this chance.

In this connection I directly told the President that the signing of the agreements on Afghanistan creates a precedent that exceeds by its importance the framework of this very problem. This is the first instance when the Soviet Union and the United States, along with parties directly involved in conflict, have signed an agreement paving the way for a political solution.

We will try our utmost to abide by the agreements, and expect the same attitude from all other parties to the accords, including the United States of America. I think that if we fail this time, if this positive precedent does not materialise, this will have far-reaching consequences and tell upon approaches to similar problems in other regions.

There are grounds for concern. Two worrying events occurred recently: Firstly, the city of Kabul, the Soviet Embassy, our troops in Kabul are fired upon. Secondly, our comrades perished in the Kandahar area yesterday, several people were reported missing. We promised that Soviet troops would not participate in hostilities since the moment of the troop withdrawal. We did act in this way. But we made the reservation to the effect that such would be their actions if there were no provocations and bandit attacks on our troops. If this happens, we will respond in a proper way. This should be clear, too.

An accord is an accord. We see what Pakistan is doing and in this connection the USSR Ministry

of Foreign Affairs issued a statement. I do not want to go into details. I only want to underscore that there are attempts to torpedo the accords, which would have serious negative consequences. This was stated most candidly to the President and the whole American delegation.

I think that the United States and the Soviet Union can make a constructive contribution to the solution of regional conflicts on the basis of political approaches, taking into account the balance of interests of all the participants in a conflict, on the basis of realism.

I can note a certain advance on humanitarian issues, on human rights. I set the question before the President as follows.

Some concrete problems arise in this sphere from time to time. We have always attentively studied and solved them. And we shall further study and solve them. But the more thought I give to the situation the more I arrive at the conclusion that the American Administration does not have an understanding of the real situation with human rights, with the processes that are taking place in our country in the sphere of democracy. Probably we too do not have a clear understanding of the American situation in this sphere of life. I proposed: let us organise a seminar within the framework of interparliamentary exchanges at which the representatives of our parliaments, political and public circles would meet and exchange information and evaluations as to what is taking place in America and in our society in this sphere. We are prepared for this.

So far there are very many speculations regarding the issue of human rights. And I must say that propaganda moves, all sorts of shows prevailed in this part of the fourth summit.

So when I learned, true with a delay, only today because I was too busy to read newspapers, that our press reacted to this accordingly, I arrived at the conclusion that it had acted correctly, within the framework of glasnost. This part of the President's visit had to be shown to our people. The people should know everything.

I am not thrilled by this part of the fourth summit. I think that it is necessary to engage in realistic politics. When the President expressed to me his views about human rights in the Soviet Union I also asked him a lot of questions. And it took him a long time to explain because he wanted me to change my opinion of the human rights situation in the United States. On hearing him out I said, "Mr President, your explanations are not convincing because I used facts based on data of the American Congress, not to mention the press which prints many materials on this question. In my position it is best to proceed from official data".

I think this is the only way to conduct talks. Let us look at one another with open eyes, let us see each other's history, traditions and values, let us respect each other's choice, respect our peoples. For, after all, it is they who are making the choice. Incidentally, the peoples always come out for rapprochement, for mutual knowledge, for friendship. The Americans are saying this and Soviet people are openly speaking about this. Much was told to the President on this score yesterday. So let us listen to what our people want. Since they are elected by the people, politicians should detect what the people want and implement this in concrete policies. We should help this process if we are set to improve Soviet-American relations and the situation in the world as a whole.

I must say that the possibility to make contact with Soviet people was a substantial fact of the US President's visit to the Soviet Union. This was the first visit by the President and his wife, the first acquaintance to replenish their impressions of the Soviet Union, of Soviet people. There was much within the framework of the programme, while in several instances they acted of their own choice, outside the programme.

Mrs Reagan's programme, which enabled her to get acquainted with the Soviet Union, was a substantial element. Yesterday, when the President conversed with our people, with me present, somebody asked him, and I think this got into the press, whether he still regarded the Soviet Union as an "evil empire".

No, he replied. Moreover, he said this at a press conference near the Czar Cannon, in the Kremlin, in the centre of the "evil empire". We take note of this and it means, as the ancient Greeks used to say, "everything flows and everything changes". This confirms my thought that the President has a sense of realism and that this is a very important quality for a politician. Regardless of what the realities are, one must look them squarely in the eye. It is only a policy based on analysis, on an evaluation of real processes that merits to be termed a policy.

I have become slightly carried away and have begun to speak for the President. I think it is best for the President to tell you himself what he thinks about his meetings. But I mentioned only those remarks which I was witness to.

In short, this is how I would sum up the results: the President's visit and the talks will serve the improvement of Soviet-American relations, their development and strengthening and will raise them to a still higher level.

Could more have been attained? This, naturally, interests both you and us. We have just had a discussion and that is why my colleagues and I were late for the meeting with you. The discussion did not produce an advance, we stopped halfway. I was compelled to say, well, politics is the art of the possible. But I hold that more could have been achieved at this meeting.

For example, I proposed to the President to make a new big stride in spelling out the political realities of our time as a platform of intentions and political actions. Here my colleagues in the leadership and I proceeded from the experience that we have accumulated after Geneva. There we stated: nuclear war is impossible, impermissible, there can be no victors in it and in general no war at all between the Soviet Union and America is permissible.

This did not mean that everything would be solved and nuclear arms would vanish on the second day or on the second week after the meeting. No, the arms remain but this joint statement was invested with tremendous meaning, evoked a great response throughout the world. Today we increasingly are arriving at the conclusion that problems should be solved by political means, on the basis of a balance of interests, on the basis of respect for the social choice of peoples. Whether we want it or not, but we are all obliged to learn to live in our real world.

If you take the latest book containing the President's speeches and the book of selected articles and speeches by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the first and in the second you will see these statements. So proceeding from the understanding of lessons that have been drawn from the practice of recent years, we proposed to include this political understanding into the present joint statement. Here is the draft that I suggested to the President: "Mindful of the existing realities in the modern world, we both believe that no outstanding issues defy solution and that they should not be solved by military means, that we both regard peaceful coexistence as an universal principle of international relations, and that the equality of all states, non-interference in internal affairs and freedom of socio-political choice should be recognised as standards that are inalienable and obligatory for all". I gave the President the Russian and the English texts. I like it, he said on reading the text.

When we came today to reach agreement on the final text of the joint statement it turned

out that not all in the President's milieu liked the idea of such a wording. And this became the subject of a discussion. We felt that there was a dislike for the term "peaceful coexistence" as it had been used in the past in documents which were signed by the Soviet leadership with Nixon and Kissinger. We withdrew this term since it was unacceptable although we really want to coexist, and I think nobody will put this to doubt.

There appeared a new variant and the President himself suggested elements of that formula. Yet it did not appear in such a form in the concluding statement although serious common understandings are stated in it. But they could have been more serious and weightier. This does not mean at all that were we to state jointly today that we should proceed from the premise of using political methods to solve problems and not to bank on their military solution that troops and armaments would vanish overnight.

No, nuclear arms did not vanish after we noted in Geneva the unacceptability and impermissibility of nuclear war. But that was a very important political point of reference both for the Soviet-American dialogue and for dialogue in the world. We regarded that as a very important statement the more so that this view was expressed separately by the leaders both of the Soviet Union and the United States. I think that at the meeting here a chance was lost to make a big step towards forming civilised international relations.

We failed to agree on the subject of the talks on conventional arms in Europe. We suggested using the summit meeting, but, naturally, without replacing the Vienna Forum, to make its work easier. For the point at issue is that we, the Soviet Union and the Americans, come to some accord, to some understanding on such an important issue as the subject of the talks, the issue that now restrains the process of preparing a mandate in Vienna.

This position, by the way, was brought forth in Geneva at a meeting between Mr George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Nonetheless, despite the positive attitude to it from both sides, it has not been included in the statement. Even though the excuse was quite plausible — it was not, purportedly, proper to replace the Vienna dialogue.

That we were not going to do. On the contrary, we wanted to make work at it easier by offering our viewpoint that could be used by the participants in the Vienna meeting. What I think is: there is much talking to the effect that one cannot advance the process of nuclear disarmament, 50 per cent reductions, without handling the problem of conventional arms and the reduction of armaments in Europe. But as soon as we come to real proposals in order to advance that process, there begin incomprehensible manoeuvring and departure.

The West was alarmed by the Warsaw Treaty's alleged superiority in strength. When we said: let us exchange data to clarify the entire matter, the other side evaded giving an answer. Now we proposed the following: let us say that we have reached an understanding on the subject of the negotiations. This will make work easier in Vienna. Nothing has come off.

The Americans have not accepted our bold and quite realistic plan consisting of three stages and integral parts directed at eliminating asymmetry and imbalance in Europe and effecting resolute transition to creating in the continent a situation when the structure of arms and armed forces is non-offensive and their level is considerably lower.

I believe that a good chance to impart proper dynamics to the talks on diminishing the danger of confrontation between the two most powerful alliances and, thus, contributing to international security has been passed up.

Politics is the art of the possible. Anyway,

I wouldn't draw dramatic conclusions because not everything that could have happened came off. Nevertheless, I ought to share my considerations so that you have a fuller understanding of the content of the talks.

Before concluding my statement, I would like to mention one general impression. I wouldn't be quite honest and truthful with you if I failed to say this. I am forming an impression about the contradictory character of the American stance. This observation is based not only on the results of this meeting. We have already come across this phenomenon before.

What is contradictory about the American approach, about the American stance? On the one hand, we have a joint statement to the effect that war should be prevented, that it is inadmissible. We conduct a business-like discussion about reducing weapons, about disarmament, talk about the preference of political solutions of problems. On the other hand, we constantly hear, and we heard that this time in Moscow and many times before the President's departure for here, about the stake on force.

This means that force — armed force, military might — is proclaimed to be the chief principle of United States policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and not only the Soviet Union. How to tally the Geneva statements with this approach? On the one hand, the President and I state that both our peoples want to live in peace, in co-operation and even be friends. This also finds its reflection in what ordinary people say. I have read American press reports. Asked about their vision of our relations in the year 2000, the Americans preferred development of friendly relations and co-operation to rivalry.

It would seem that we should proceed from this, guide ourselves in accordance with the will of our peoples. This does not happen in real politics. This is also noticeable in the sphere of economic ties. The clear interest of the influential part of the American business community to co-operate with us faces bans, restrictions and downright intimidation. Most unfavoured-nation status is applied in the United States with regard to the Soviet Union.

The President and I yesterday had a serious discussion on this subject. I said: why should the dead grip at the coat tails of the living, referring to the Jackson-Vanik amendment. One of them is dead, the other is a political corpse. Why should they hold us back? The amendment was adopted in a totally different situation, decades ago.

In today's totally different, changed world, we ought to conceive and shape our policy on the basis of present-day realities.

This reminds me of British legislation under which wrongful actions committed today are judged on the basis of laws adopted in the 13th-14th centuries.

Traditions do differ. I have nothing against them. This is up to the British people. I don't mean to offend the British correspondents. But in politics, one should proceed from today's realities and even look into the future. I said to the President: we have already proved that we can live without each other economically, now we should prove that we can co-operate, the more so, for we are simply doomed to co-operation. The alternative to that leads to a totally unpredictable situation. One cannot maintain lasting co-operation without it resting on trade, on economic co-operation.

I would even risk raising the question in the following way: the more we depend on each other economically, the more we will be predictable on the political plane.

Do you agree? You may not reply, just give your answers in your newspaper commentaries.

We see this contradiction in the sphere of propaganda and in the behaviour of officials, especially on issues of human rights. We say yes,

we are independent, each people has the right to social choice, relies on its values. Yes, we are different, but that is no reason for confrontation, the more so, for war. It's good that there is diversity. This is a ground for comparison, an impetus to thought, to judgement.

We can remain ourselves and live normally, in a civilised world. We have not yet noticed on the part of the Americans a serious wish to orient themselves at new phenomena, to take into account the changes in our society. As Mayakovsky said: if stars light up, does it not mean that somebody needs this? So this must be to somebody's advantage. But I am sure that our peoples have a different view, and this is the decisive factor in shaping the policy. This contradictoriness in American policy, in the conduct of the US Administration is disappointing to our people.

And still, returning to the overall appraisal of the fourth Soviet-American summit, I would like to say that this is a great event, that the dialogue continues. The continuity has been given an added impulse, the Soviet-American relations have advanced. I don't know if by one or by two stages, but in any case, they were brought to new stages. And this in itself is a remarkable fact in world politics.

This is what I wanted to tell you.

*Then Mikhail Gorbachev answered questions from journalists.*

*(All questions are translated from the Russian).*

**QUESTION** (the newspaper *Izvestia*): Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have held a number of fruitful meetings with President Reagan. He will leave the White House in eight months' time. Do you think that regular contacts with the next President are possible? Do you think that there can be a meeting to get acquainted with the next President of the USA after he is inaugurated?

**GORBACHEV**: I think this is not just possible, but necessary, and vitally so.

**QUESTION** (CBS Television Network, USA): You have mentioned twice the missed opportunities at the talks on strategic offensive arms. You have also said that politics is the art of the possible. Therefore I would like to ask you if there is an opportunity to conclude a treaty on strategic offensive arms with the current US Administration if the US side continues insisting on preserving the SDI programme?

**GORBACHEV**: I am sure there is still an opportunity to conclude the treaty this year. First, I am encouraged in this optimism by the progress that has been achieved over this period between Washington and Moscow and the exchange of opinions that was conducted here almost round-the-clock. It warrants such an optimistic appraisal.

**QUESTION** (the newspaper *Il Messaggero*, Italy): I would like to ask you if, after your pronouncements, President Reagan said something about the United States obligations under the Geneva accords on Afghanistan.

**GORBACHEV**: It seemed to me that it is not only the President but also all the members of the United States delegation that realise the importance of a successful solution to the Afghan conflict on the principles that have been laid down in Geneva. I think that the exchange of opinions on this theme was sincere and useful.

**QUESTION** (National Public Radio, USA): Mr General Secretary, you have been asked several times in the past few days if a fifth summit with the President of the United States is possible. You have answered as a rule that it is possible, but that everything depends on how matters proceed at the Moscow summit. Has it achieved such a progress as would warrant the holding of a fifth summit with President Reagan this fall?

**GORBACHEV**: I think that the holding of a summit is possible on one condition — if we have an opportunity to achieve a treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction with taking

into consideration the entire range of questions, including the problems of ABM and sea-based Cruise missiles. I do not go into details. All this is in the area of talks and exchange of opinions. Since I state the possibility of achieving a treaty, I believe that the possibility of a fifth summit still remains a reality. It is only with this matter that I link the possibility of a fifth meeting.

**QUESTION** (newspaper *New York Daily News*, USA): We are all amazed at the degree of openness which exists in your society. The Americans were yesterday also amazed at the tone of the speech of President Reagan at Moscow University.

We were surprised at the fact that the Soviet press has not contained a word about that speech by the President. What is your reaction to that speech?

**GORBACHEV**: Regrettably, I have not been able so far to familiarise myself either with President Reagan's speech at the meeting with writers or with his speech at the meeting at Moscow University. Nevertheless I think that these meetings were useful. At any rate the comrades who are knowledgeable about these meetings said that they had been useful. As to our press, its representatives are present here and if they have not yet had time to publish some reports, I think they will do so.

**QUESTION** (Sana News Agency, Syria): Mikhail Sergeevich, Arab countries highly appreciate the just words you have said recently about the Palestinian people who have been waging these days a courageous struggle against the Israeli occupiers. Tell us, please, what you have achieved at your meetings with Mr Reagan on the Palestinian question and on the Middle East settlement in general.

**GORBACHEV**: We noted that there have appeared real aspects related to a political settlement of the Middle East situation.

First, there exists in the world community, also among the permanent members of the Security Council, the awareness of the need for settlement in the framework of an international conference. It is quite a different matter that the question of its content has not yet been elucidated. Then, there is an awareness that there exist the interests of Syria, there exist the interests of the Palestinian people, the interests of Israel, the interests of other countries of the region who are affected by this conflict.

We stand for a political settlement of all issues, with due account for the interests of all sides concerned and, of course, for the principled provisions of the relevant UN Resolutions.

This implies that all the Israeli-occupied lands be returned and the Palestinian people's rights be restored. We said to President Reagan how we view the role of the United States, but we cannot decide for the Arabs in what form the Palestinians will take part in the international conference. Let the Arabs themselves decide, while the Americans and we should display respect for their choice.

Furthermore, we ought to recognise the right of Israel to security and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. In what form — let the Palestinians together with their Arab friends decide that. This opens up prospects for active exchanges, for a real process. Anyway, it seems to me that such an opportunity is emerging.

I will disclose one more thing: we said that following the start of a conference — a normal, effective conference, rather than a front for separate talks — a forum which would be inter-related with bilateral, tripartite and other forms of activity, we will be ready to handle the issue of settling diplomatic relations with Israel.

We are thus introducing one more new element. This shows that we firmly stand on the ground of reality, on the ground of

recognition of the balance of interests. Naturally, there are principal issues — the return of the lands, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. I should reiterate: we proceed from the premise that the Israeli people and the state of Israel have the right to their security, because there can be no security of one at the expense of the other. A solution that would untie this very tight knot should be found.

**QUESTION** (newspaper *Trybuna Ludu*, Poland): Comrade General Secretary, you said this morning that issues of conventional arms in Europe would be considered today. Now you have said that the West rejects the USSR's proposal in this area. We know that your initiative also comprises proposals put forward by other socialist countries, Poland included. What, in your view, is the future solution of this issue? What can be expected after Vienna? For your programme contains even some replies to the aspirations of Western countries, social democratic and other parties.

**GORBACHEV**: To be fully objective, I ought to say the following: The American side does not refuse to consider the subject of the talks on the basis of the accords reached in Geneva at our Foreign Ministers' meeting. It evaded making a statement and jointly recording the attitude to this question at the Moscow meeting.

That is why I should be absolutely objective so as not to cast any aspersions on the American side when such important matters are dealt with. They argue that they have to consult the other participants. But we say that what we have proposed does not contradict the necessity to consult. It appears that something is being withheld. Nevertheless, I believe that the prospects of defining the mandate of the Vienna conference are real.

I must say that the question of this conference's mandate was being linked to a certain extent by the American side with other CSCE issues, especially with the humanitarian sphere. Going on there, too, is a live, vigorous process, taking place is a collision of views, their comparison. I am of the opinion that solutions are possible.

We hold that in its foreign policy the Soviet Union always take into account the opinion of both East and West Europe. That is exactly why we are trying to work together with our allies. Now this is being done better and we have a regular exchange of views. With the West European countries, too, we are trying to conduct matters in such a way that there would be full clarity and understanding. We want to build our common European home together.

**QUESTION** (by a British journalist): There is a widespread view that the differences between the American approach to the SDI programme and your position are the main obstacle to the conclusion of the START Treaty. Have you succeeded in achieving any progress in removing the differences in respect of the SDI programme in the course of this summit? If you have, what concrete progress has been achieved? Do you continue to think as before that this is the biggest obstacle to concluding a treaty on strategic offensive arms?

**GORBACHEV**: I will first answer the last question. Yes, that is what I think because SDI means destabilisation. It defies normal logic — to scale down strategic offensive arms on Earth and at the same time to build bridges for an arms race in outer space. The American side is trying to persuade us that these are only defensive weapons.

We do not think so. And we are competent to pass such judgement. If the arms race is moved to outer space this is fraught with a most serious destabilisation of the entire situation in the world. I reminded the President: in Geneva we stated that we will not strive for military superiority. You have the impression, I told him, that you have a possibility to surpass us by way of outer space, to achieve advantage.

Thereby you retreat from the Geneva statement. We had a pointed discussion on the philosophical aspect of this "defensive" system.

Then there was yet another moment. In order to convince us to support SDI the American side stated its readiness to share secrets with us when it achieves any real results in this matter. I told the President: Mr President, permit me to disagree with you and put this assurance in doubt. The two sides at present are trying in vain to reach agreement on the verification of the presence of sea-launched cruise missiles on two or three classes of ships. You are not prepared for this and refuse to consent. How can we believe that you will suddenly open all secrets related to SDI? This is not serious, this is beyond the framework of real politics.

Yet, while conducting such a philosophical discussion involving military strategy, we nevertheless agreed to act on the basis of the Washington statement, the more so that it contains several concrete matters.

I will illustrate this: coming out for strict observance of the ABM Treaty and the commitment not to withdraw from it in the course of an agreed-upon period of time and considering the position taken by the American side, the Soviet side tabled a compromise proposal on this question on which views differ. In particular we proposed to carry out the following.

First. To exchange data related to work in the ABM field, to hold meetings of experts, to conduct mutual visits of testing sites where work in this field is being conducted.

Second. To exchange information with the aim of avoiding lack of confidence that the commitments adopted by the sides are being observed.

Third. To effect verification of compliance with commitments, up to and including inspections at sites giving rise to concern of the sides.

Fourth. Holding of consultations to consider situations which, in the opinion of either side, place its highest interests in jeopardy.

In the course of the consultations the sides shall use all the possible means to settle the situations on a mutually acceptable basis.

Thereby the completion of the drafting of the treaty on the 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive arms in 1988, as you see, will require considerable effort but we remain confident that this is possible.

This is the first time that I have given such a detailed answer to this question.

**QUESTION** (*Guardian*, Great Britain): There are five thousand journalists in Moscow covering the summit. The Soviet Union's internal policy took an unexpected turn for them when in his television interview Mr Yeltsin suddenly called for the resignation of Mr Ligachev. Mr Burlatsky, Mrs Zaslavskaya as well as Mr Yuri Afanasyev have suddenly started speaking about difficulties which are encountered by the election of delegates to the forthcoming Party conference. You call for the proponents of perestroika to be participants and delegates of the conference but at present only some manifestations of perestroika are evident. What is your personal view of the process of political perestroika in the Soviet Union as the Party conference approaches and what do you think of Mr Yeltsin's call for Mr Ligachev's resignation?

**GORBACHEV**: The course of perestroika and its prospects are fully outlined in the theses of the CPSU Central Committee on this question. Sitting before you is one of the compilers of these theses. Also taking part in this were all the members of the Political Bureau, the entire leadership. The theses express our collective opinion concerning the platform of the forthcoming Party conference and the prospects of perestroika. I think that the conference will give a powerful second wind to the entire process

of perestroika along all the main directions. We will act resolutely but with circumspection. A huge country, a huge responsibility. We should not put either ourselves, our friends or the world community in a difficult situation. In the course of their personal experience of perestroika our people are changing, just as we ourselves. We have emerged from one stage, analysed it, drawn lessons, drawn up our plans and searching for ways.

In the main we have found them, but there remain many tactical and practical problems. It is not always, maybe, that things are moving successfully, it is not always that we find the correct solution of some matters. Setbacks occur. But if we are to speak of the main thing — perestroika is picking up speed and the people are for perestroika. Society is in motion, the Party is undergoing renewal, all spheres of society are in the process of renewal.

Of course, in our society you can find facts to illustrate any theme and thereby fulfil any assignment that the publishers of your newspapers will give you. Whatever task is set to you you will confirm by concrete facts. At this summit there were some attempts to use facts taken out of context. After all, any facts can be selected. The thing is to see the tendency of phenomena in generalised form, their directedness and their perspective.

As to Comrade Yeltsin's interview to the BBC, I am in total ignorance about it. (A voice in the hall, 'and the ABC'.) I was compelled already yesterday to say that I know nothing about this. Of course, this does not do me credit. But you, too, did not do much for me to learn about this in time. I have asked for the full texts of what Comrade Yeltsin said. I want to read them. If the correspondents who interviewed him could provide me with a full recording, without any tape editing, I would be grateful.

Yeltsin is a member of the Central Committee. The things he is speaking about were discussed at last year's October plenary meeting. There were 27 speakers, they spoke without any preparation whatsoever, like here at the press conference. And his speech, too, came as an absolute surprise. Taking place at the plenary meeting was an exchange of views about the report to be made on the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. But Yeltsin took the floor and the exchange of views began immediately. All the 27 comrades were unanimous that Comrade Yeltsin's generalisations and conclusions concerning various aspects of the Central Committee's activity, the situation in the Political Bureau, the work of the secretariat were wrong. His speech was qualified as politically erroneous. So a discussion had taken place and a decision was passed. In this particular case it might be that Comrade Yeltsin disagrees with the decision of the Party's Central Committee. Then we in the Central Committee should ask Comrade Yeltsin what this is about and what he is pressing for.

As to Comrade Ligachev and his resignation, no such problem in the Party's Central Committee, in the Political Bureau exists. I advise you to proceed from this.

**QUESTION** (the Soviet magazine *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*): Not only journalists but also politologists who consider themselves experts on US affairs have come to Moscow. Many of them say that the conservative forces in the United States, which tried to prevent the ratification of the treaty, are now closing ranks believing that the process of developing relations between the USSR and the United States is going on too rapidly and that they should take all measures so as to stop this movement or to reverse it regardless of what position is taken by the future administration. Did you speak about this with President Reagan and what do you think about these forces?

**GORBACHEV**: I think that if you put this question to the President, and he is to appear

before you soon, he will give you a better answer. In any case, the views of American conservatives will have little influence on us.

**QUESTION** (US television company NBC): Concerning your conservatives, Mr General Secretary. An analysis was conducted in America and also in your country and according to it you have only three or five years left in which to ensure the success of perestroika. If you fail, you will be outstripped by conservatives and critics inside the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. What is your personal assessment of what has been achieved to ensure the success of perestroika that is necessary for your great society's survival?

**GORBACHEV**: This is what I will say. The most important thing in our perestroika is that through democracy and openness we have already drawn the people into it while by way of perfecting our political system we will substantially strengthen this tendency. It may be that there are places and processes that perestroika has not yet influenced but today it is present already everywhere.

The other day, for instance, there was a debate on Sakhalin Island. As a result of it a plenum of the Regional Party Committee was convened and discussed the opinions of working people, communists. The plenum found their remarks and demands to be just, found it necessary to strengthen the Party leadership in the region and adopted decisions that were needed for the process of democratisation on Sakhalin to gain momentum. So perestroika has reached Sakhalin. But it also is spreading in depth, penetrating all spheres.

In the course of three years nobody has proposed a convincing alternative to the policy of perestroika and I am convinced that no such alternative exists. It is necessary to restructure, to renovate the country on the basis of our principles, our ideals, using the tremendous material, spiritual and intellectual potential of society. The Party and the people have the strength to carry out perestroika and accomplish a breakthrough. There is no alternative to perestroika, and perestroika will be victorious. It may have occasional retreats, manoeuvres, even setbacks, but this will not change the main direction of our society's development. We have embarked on the path of irreversible changes.

**QUESTION** (Portuguese newspaper *Diario de Noticias*): I would like to hear your views on Angola. Secondly, when speaking of the results of the meeting you repeated several times the words "missed", "let slip a chance".

**GORBACHEV**: Better "let slip" than "missed". "Missed" is forever while "let slip" applies only to this meeting and we still have a possibility to go again for this chance in the future.

As to Angola, I must say that we had an interesting, substantive and realistic exchange of views. Both the Americans and we stated the possibility of advancement towards settling that regional conflict, providing, both sides stressed, strict observance of the UN Security Council's relevant resolutions, the exclusion of South Africa's interference in Angolan affairs and the granting of independence to Namibia. We are not involved in that process directly, but we supported the talks conducted by the Angolans, Cubans and South Africans through US mediation. If all the parties believe that the Soviet Union should join in more specifically in addition to expressing its considerations, we are prepared for that, too. Anyway, such was the discussion: it was based on the understanding that this process can bring about a positive result.

**QUESTION** (newspaper *Izvestia*): First of all, I want to say that our newspaper today published a rather detailed account of President Reagan's remarks at the House of Writers and at Moscow State University. This is in reply to the question asked by my American colleagues. We, in watching the Soviet-American dialogue, have

always felt that initially the difficulties related to verification and inspection originated from our side. Now we think that the accent has moved to the American side. Has the summit confirmed this reorientation?

**GORBACHEV**: Your observations are correct. And we discussed that by relying on facts. It has turned out that previous statements were largely bluff. Now, on starting to deal with real processes, we are in a very resolute mood. Verification should be real, effective. In the field of verification, thanks to the experience gained in elaborating the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we now co-operate constructively. We think that solutions will be found on these issues as well.

**QUESTION** (newspaper *L'Unita*, Italy): President Reagan cited a saying, "it was born, it wasn't rushed". Still, what we are witnessing is a resolute turn for the better in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. What is Europe's role in that process, and don't you think that Europe should join this process more actively?

**GORBACHEV**: In all the processes so far, Europe was not only present, but it actively participated in defining problems that became subjects of discussion at the summit meetings between the US President and the General Secretary. This also applies to our East European allies. So, Europe, both East and West, is always there acting and making its dynamic contribution. We will act precisely in this manner. I know that President Reagan stated just that. Moreover, today, when the world is looking for answers to burning and hard questions, I see no way for a successful solution of international problems without Europe, which possesses unique experience — historic, intellectual, diplomatic and political — without the European contribution.

**QUESTION** (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*): The latest edition of our weekly published a dispatch by our US-based correspondent Iona Andronov regarding 300 Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan who had been forced across the border inside Pakistan. The publication was immediately followed by letters to the editorial board with inquiries about their fate. In discussing regional conflicts, has this question been raised during your conversation with President Reagan?

**GORBACHEV**: I have also received letters from some mothers of these soldiers. We approached the American side in order to consider this question practically. Such discussions have been held. Specifically, we did not discuss this matter with President Reagan. But it began to be elaborated at working level, at the level of experts. I will add that this problem has also been raised with Pakistan. We will do everything so that our people return home.

**QUESTION** (*Los Angeles Times*, United States): Presidential elections are held in the United States every four years, no matter whether they are needed or not. But the President is limited to eight years in office. Your term as General Secretary has not been strictly defined. Many Americans would like to know how long you intend to remain in your post.

**GORBACHEV**: This does not depend on my intentions, although your notions of our democracy are such as if the people were uninvolved. This is another fact showing that we have wrong notions of each other. Nevertheless I shall answer your question. This problem related to Party and other elective bodies will be referred to the Party conference with taking into account what has already been stated briefly in the theses. It will be reflected in the new election law. So all this will be put on a basis of law.

**QUESTION** (the newspaper *Rizospastis*, Greece): Mikhail Sergeevich, in your opening speech you have mentioned a number of regional conflicts. But you have not touched upon the

southern part of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Cyprus problem. Does this mean that these questions have not come up for discussion at the talks, or that the differences were so great that there have been no progress. Do you intend to visit Greece this year?

**GORBACHEV:** As to the first question, I shall say this. We have raised these problems during intensive exchanges of opinions in working groups, but they have not been developed because of the lack of interest on the US part. As to my visits, we plan them, and when there is clarity, we shall surely avail ourselves of the invitation and pay the visit.

**QUESTION (NHK Television Network, Japan):** What other regional Asian problems, aside from Kampuchea and Afghanistan, have you discussed with President Reagan? Have you discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula in connection with the coming Olympic games?

**GORBACHEV:** We spoke of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. I gathered the impression — to tell the truth, we did not have enough time to exchange detailed opinions on the latter question — that the American side is aware that some headway in this respect is needed. Our negotiating partners negatively described the stand of North Korea. We, on the contrary, described the stand of the DPRK government to the President as constructive and inviting to a dialogue and stated that the DPRK's government is prepared, both on a bilateral basis and with the participation of the Americans, to conduct an exchange of views on the present-day state of affairs and on prospects for reunification on the principles on the basis of which the nation should reunite. We said that this was exactly the opportunity which had not been used so far.

**QUESTION (Al Hawadis magazine, Lebanon):** You said that during the summit the positions on the Middle East problem drew closer together. Could you specify in what exactly the stands of the United States and the Soviet Union on this matter coincide? Will Mr Shultz take with him some joint position for his trip to the region? And secondly, yesterday Mr Reagan did not say anything about the Middle East when addressing students at Moscow State University. Today you did not say anything about the situation in the Persian Gulf area. But today you said that Afghanistan could be used as an example for a settlement of a similar situation in Kampuchea and elsewhere. Could you elaborate?

**GORBACHEV:** About the Middle East. I want to repeat once again that, firstly, there are elements which make it possible to state that the positions were brought closer together and first of all the recognition that an international conference is needed. Secondly, there is awareness that within the framework of such a conference it would be possible to use other forums. There is awareness that the provisions of appropriate UN resolutions should be utilised. I think there are aspects which will require examination. These are the essence and content of such a conference, the question of Palestine, and of the PLO's participation in the negotiating process. And, finally, the United States of America is aware that the Soviet Union should participate in such a settlement.

We gave an opportunity for the Americans to work on that for several years. They worked and saw that nothing came out of that. After they saw that, we resumed the dialogue.

For our part, we are ready for constructive co-operation.

About the Persian Gulf. This question was discussed rather thoroughly. We adhered to the view that the conflict there is very serious and everything should be done for it not to develop into a dangerous direction. This is why we say: it is essential to use to the full the potential inherent in the first resolution of the UN Security Council and to enable the UN Secretary General or his envoy to utilise the potential and to secure cessation of hostilities.

I think we correctly call for restraint and for the display of composure. We are the advocates of a settlement of the conflict. The threat of its spread with dangerous consequences is real. We are calling on the Americans: let us relieve the Persian Gulf of US military presence. Let us better introduce a United Nations force so that the process would not be spurred in a wrong, dangerous direction.

**QUESTION (the Washington Post newspaper, USA):** Could you elaborate on the Soviet stand on SDI. Did the American side make it clear that there was an opportunity to resolve the question of a mandate for the Vienna meeting on conventional arms?

**GORBACHEV:** The Joint Statement has a record which confirms the Washington Statement and the recognition of the need for intensive work in this sphere on the basis of both American proposals, specifically on gauges, sensors, and our proposals. So, it does contain specifics which the negotiators should thoroughly discuss.

Secondly, I am always for the accuracy of wording but in this case, perhaps, I was inaccurate: I am not a professional diplomat, you know. At Geneva, there was an exchange of views on the questions of the Vienna meeting and on a mandate for the conference, and, specifically, the negotiators approached the question of the subject of the talks. Now a few words as to whether mutual understanding of the two sides, American and Soviet, was achieved. There was a formula which comrade Eduard Shevardnadze read out at this meeting. Mr Shultz confirmed that the formula had been really transmitted to the negotiators in Vienna but that the process of discussion was not carried through over there. Over here, in Moscow, it was again the subject of a very thorough study but the work was not completed for reasons which I already mentioned.

**QUESTION (The New York Times newspaper, USA):** Mr General Secretary, when you were in Washington you told Mr Reagan that the Soviet Union was prepared to discontinue the supply of arms to Nicaragua if the United States stops funding the Contras. Then, later on, Mr Shevardnadze and George Shultz discussed the question and we were told that the Soviet stand did not change, i.e. if the USA stops deliveries to Central America the Soviet Union will discontinue deliveries to Nicaragua. Could you confirm that this is really so and that you discussed this question within the context of consideration of the state of affairs in Central America?

**GORBACHEV:** Today we discussed this problem in a very detailed manner, and made an excursion into history. When we make such excursions we reveal different points of view and explanations. I suggested, nevertheless, that one should proceed from today's realities. There is the Contadora process, there are the Guatemala agreements, there is the truce, and there is movement in the search for a political settlement. And it is essential, by relying on this process, to support it, giving an opportunity to the opposing forces in Nicaragua to decide this question themselves with the participation of other Latin Americans and representatives of Central America.

I told President Reagan that I was reaffirming what had been said during strolls at the White House: let us limit ourselves to the delivery of police weapons.

In general, this subject will be examined in future as well. We urged the Americans to take into consideration that the process had reached such a stage when it could be completed positively. Over there a certain colonel of the Somoza Army appeared. He served Somoza well and is now serving America. He makes every effort to frustrate the entire process. I don't know, maybe the colonel should be replaced by a sergeant who will be closer to the people and matters would be settled more speedily.

**QUESTION (Soviet Television):** Speaking of foreign policy aspects of perestroika, it has spread far to the East beyond Sakhalin and far to the West beyond Brest. I mean the immense attention of the public, of ordinary people, to what is happening, and the desire to get an insight into the holy of holies of the process. Hundreds of people from among anti-war organisations from all over the world arrived in Moscow and followed the talks. I know that tomorrow you will have a meeting with public and anti-war organisations. Considering all that, what is your opinion about the role of the public and people's diplomacy in the entire process taking place over the past three years?

**GORBACHEV:** I have expressed my opinions on that score more than once but, summing up, I can say today: we would have made a great error in politics if we did not pay attention to very deep changes in the sentiments of the world public and ordinary people on Earth. They have got sick and tired of wars, tensions, conflicts, and of vast amounts of information which mar the present-day and promise a still worse future. People came to feel that not always their will, word and desire, aspiration and interests find reflection in real politics. They began to act, uniting into appropriate organisations and bringing into use everything they have available. We see among members of the movements both ordinary people and intellectuals — physicians, scientists, former military officers, veterans, young people, and children. I think all this is very serious and if someone thinks that there is anyone's 'hand' in it, I would like to shake that hand because this is a powerful hand which stirred to action vigorous forces.

The world feels that changes are needed. Life itself has raised such questions that people came to feel the need to directly intervene in politics. Only a policy, fertilised by the experience of the masses, their sentiments, their will, and using the competence of scientists and enriched by ethics and by the contribution which intellectuals and people of culture can make — only such a policy has a future and only such a policy is adequate to the real processes which are under way and has a right to existence nowadays.

**QUESTION (the Associated Press, USA):** Mr General Secretary, do you agree with the evaluation of American-Soviet relations of the past period of detente when main attention was devoted to economic co-operation and to the observance of political tolerance. To what extent, in your view, can both superpowers can and must be interdependent from the economic point of view?

**GORBACHEV:** I think that both today's and tomorrow's realities, if analysed in earnest, bring us to the view that we must co-operate and this would be in the interests of both our two peoples and of the whole world. I visualise a future world in which the American and Soviet peoples would co-operate, in the economic sphere, too, and would exchange the fruits of their labour, complementing each other. This is why I conceived an idea about a joint space flight to Mars so as to compete not in who gets ahead in the amount of weapons but in combining our potentials, scientific, economic, intellectual, and setting an example of co-operation in this direction. This would promote progress very much, not to mention that it would give greater scope to our co-operation and would work for building confidence between our two peoples. Yesterday I was pressurising the President on these matters in public by using forbidden tricks, and he said: "Yes, we shall think it over". And to my mind, his words convey the idea that it is necessary to begin to study the problems.

Now, I would like to say goodbye. You should conserve your energies for a meeting with President Reagan. Thank you for your active participation and I must apologise that perhaps I

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# Soviet-American Joint Statement

*The following is the full text of the Soviet-American joint statement:*

## Joint Statement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States issued following meetings in Moscow, USSR May 29 — June 1, 1988

IN ACCORDANCE with the understanding reached during the Soviet-US summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, and confirmed at the Washington summit in December 1987, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, met in Moscow May 29 — June 2, 1988.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei A. Gromyko; Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Alexander N. Yakovlev; alternate member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defence of the USSR, Dmitri T. Yazov; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoli F. Dobrynin; assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoli S. Chernyaev; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Alexander A. Bessmertnykh; and Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America, Yuri V. Dubinin.

Attending on the US side were Secretary of State, George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci; Presidential Chief of Staff, Howard H. Baker, Jr.; assistant to the President for National Security, Colin L. Powell; Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Paul H. Nitze; Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Ambassador of the US to the USSR, Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Rozanne L. Ridgway.

The General Secretary and the President view the Moscow summit as an important step in the process of putting Soviet-US relations on a more productive and sustainable basis. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues to which the two leaders agreed during their initial meeting in Geneva in November, 1985 — an agenda encompassing arms control, human rights and humanitarian matters, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. Serious differences remain on important issues; the frank dialogue which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences.

The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample opportunity for candid exchange. As a result, the sides achieved a better understanding of each other's positions. The two leaders welcomed the progress achieved in various areas of Soviet-US relations since their last meeting in Washington, notwithstanding the difficulty and complexity of the issues. They noted with satisfaction numerous concrete agreements which have been achieved, and expressed their determination to

redouble efforts in the months ahead in areas where work remains to be done. They praised the creative and intensive efforts made by representatives of both sides in recent months to resolve outstanding differences.

Assessing the state of Soviet-US relations, the General Secretary and the President underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in laying the foundations for a realistic approach to the problems of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict. They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimise the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterise the Soviet-US relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present, but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a process which the General Secretary and the President believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.

### I Arms Control

The General Secretary and the President, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

#### INF

The General Secretary and the President signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of Soviet and US nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

#### Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a joint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in

the joint draft text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the joint draft text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the treaty.

Taking into account a treaty on strategic offensive arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington summit joint statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the joint draft text of an associated protocol. In connection with their obligations under the protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the nuclear risk reduction centres for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the joint draft text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated protocol.

The joint draft treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 on the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 per cent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the joint statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared joint draft texts of an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol, and a memorandum of understanding on data, which are integral parts of the treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges, to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.

D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, of locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the joint draft text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding the treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agreement, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the US President agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. The delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12, 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay.

### Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the USSR and the US on notifications of launches of inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, signed during the Moscow summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

### Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-

scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the USSR-US Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the USSR-US Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders therefore noted with satisfaction the signing of the joint verification experiment agreement, the considerable preparation under way for the experiment, and the positive co-operation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites. They also noted the substantial progress on a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible after the joint verification experiment has been conducted and analysed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security. They expressed the hope that each state not a party to the treaty will join it, or make an equally binding commitment under international law to forgo acquisition of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. This will enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.

### Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the Soviet-US agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the centres can play an important role in the context

of a future treaty on reducing US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

### Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of on-going multilateral negotiations and bilateral Soviet-US consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. While noting the progress already achieved in the talks and the difficult problems with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, the leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants. They gave instructions to their respective delegations to this effect.

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasised the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

### Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasised the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting. The General Secretary and the President also noted that full implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and mutual confidence.

They also discussed the situation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.

### Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The USSR and the US will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid concluding document.

### Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology.



### Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly

The General Secretary and the President noted the importance of the ongoing third special session on disarmament.

## II Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns

The General Secretary and the President engaged in a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The leaders reviewed the increasingly broad and detailed Soviet-US dialogue in this area and agreed that it should be conducted at all levels in order to achieve sustained, concrete progress. They noted that this dialogue should seek to maximise assurance of the rights, freedoms and human dignity of individuals; promotion of people-to-people communications and contacts; active sharing of spiritual, cultural, historical and other values; and greater mutual understanding and respect between the two countries. Toward this end, they discussed the possible establishment of a forum which, meeting regularly, would bring together participants from across the range of their two societies. They noted steps already taken to establish the exchange of information and contacts between legislative bodies of both countries, as well as discussions between legal experts, physicians and representatives of other professions directly involved in matters pertaining to human rights, and between representatives of non-governmental organisations.

## III Regional Issues

The General Secretary and the President thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April, 1988, conclusion in Geneva of accords on an Afghanistan settlement. Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the USSR and the US.

They reaffirmed their intention to continue Soviet-US discussions at all levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom and security. They emphasised the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

## IV Bilateral Affairs

The General Secretary and the President reviewed progress in further expanding bilateral contacts, exchanges and co-operation since their meeting in Washington, D.C. in December, 1987. They noted the increasingly important role that mutually beneficial interchange between the two countries can play in improving mutual understanding and providing stability in the Soviet-US relationship. They stated their intention to intensify such ties.

They noted with particular satisfaction that concrete agreements had been reached in most of the areas identified at their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington.

### Bilateral Agreements and Co-operative Activities

The General Secretary and the President welcomed the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements which open new opportunities for

fruitful co-operation in the following fields; co-operation in transportation science and technology; maritime search and rescue; operational coordination between Soviet and US radio navigation systems in the Northern Pacific and Bering Sea; and mutual fisheries relations.

The two leaders welcomed the recent signing of a new memorandum on civilian nuclear reactor safety under the bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy. There was an exchange of notes to extend that agreement.

They expressed satisfaction with the recent signing of a new protocol under the bilateral housing agreement for co-operation in construction research relating to extreme geological and unusual climatic conditions.

They reviewed the status of negotiations between the two countries concerning maritime shipping, the USSR-US maritime boundary, basic scientific research, and emergency pollution clean-up in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They instructed their negotiators to accelerate efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in these areas at the earliest opportunity.

The two leaders welcomed the start of bilateral discussions on combatting narcotics trafficking. They noted with satisfaction ongoing consultations between the two sides concerning law of the sea, air and sea transportation safety, and areas of mutual interest in the field of law.

### Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

Noting the expansion of exchanges in the areas of education, science, culture and sports under the general exchanges agreement, the two leaders welcomed the signing of a new implementing programme for 1989-91 under the agreement and expressed their intention to continue expansion of such exchanges. During the time in which this programme is in force, the two sides, taking into consideration their mutual interests as well as financial and technical conditions, will conduct negotiations on the opening of culture/information centres in the USSR and the US with the aim of signing an appropriate agreement on behalf of the governments of both countries.

They expressed satisfaction that, over the course of their dialogue, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between non-governmental organisations have significantly increased and become one of the most dynamic elements in the bilateral relationship. They reaffirmed their commitment to further growth of such exchanges, which contribute to mutual understanding, and welcomed plans for increased exchanges of young people in the future. In this context, they expressed their readiness to consider in practical terms the idea of further developing exchanges of high-school students. They cited recent joint Soviet-US initiatives on culture, theatre and the cinema as examples of new opportunities to engage those involved in the creative arts.

Noting the rapidly growing sports ties between the two countries, including their National Olympic Committees, the two leaders expressed their support for the international Olympic movement, which promotes international co-operation and understanding through athletic competition.

### Other Co-operative Activities

The General Secretary and the President noted the successful expansion of scientific co-operation within the framework of bilateral agreements in environmental protection, medical science and public health, artificial heart research and development, agriculture, and studies of the world ocean, and expressed their intention to continue to expand activities under these agreements in areas of mutual benefit to the two sides.

The General Secretary and the President noted

with pleasure the commencement of work on a conceptual design of an international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER), under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, between scientists and experts from the Soviet Union, United States, European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan. The two leaders noted the significance of this next step toward the development of fusion power as a cheap, environmentally sound, and essentially inexhaustible energy source for the benefit of all mankind.

The General Secretary and the President welcomed agreement by representatives of the Soviet Union, United States, Canada and France, to institutionalise in the near future the Cospas/Sarsat space-based, life-saving global search-and-rescue system.

Both leaders reaffirmed their support for the WHO/UNICEF goal of reducing the scale of preventable childhood death through the most effective methods of saving children. They urged other countries and the international community to intensify efforts to achieve this goal.

### Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with activities since the Washington summit in expanding co-operation with respect to global climate and environmental change, including in areas of mutual concern relating to environmental protection, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone and a possible global warming trend. They emphasised their desire to make more active use of the unique opportunities afforded by the space programmes of the two countries to conduct global monitoring of the environment and the ecology of the Earth's land, oceans and atmosphere. They underscored the need to continue to promote both bilateral and multilateral co-operation in this important area in the future.

### Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Co-operation

Recognising the long-standing commitment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 USSR-US co-operative agreement in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space co-operation by exchanging flight opportunities for scientific instruments to fly on each other's spacecraft, and by exchanging results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of assessing prospects for further Soviet-US co-operation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international co-operation.

### Arctic Contacts and Co-operation

Taking into account the unique environmental, demographic and other characteristics of the Arctic, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for expanded bilateral and regional contacts and co-operation in this area. They noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental co-operation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an international Arctic science committee of states with interests in the region. They expressed their support for increased people-to-people contacts between the native peoples of Alaska and the Soviet North.

The General Secretary and the President noted the positive role played by the multilateral Antarctic Treaty and emphasised the importance of Soviet-US scientific and environmental co-operation in that region.

*(Continued on next page)*

# Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at meeting with representatives of world public

*ON June 2 Mikhail Gorbachev had a meeting in the Kremlin's Sverdlov Hall with representatives of the international public, who have come to Moscow in connection with the Soviet-US summit.*

*Greeted by them with enthusiastic clapping, the Soviet leader, for his part, welcomed them and made the following statement:*

This is perhaps the last act of the Moscow summit. The Moscow meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States has indeed been more than what has been covered by the programme of meetings and talks between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the US President.

And this is fine because, on the one hand, this underlines the significance of the meeting and, on the other, this demonstrates that everything that happens in our relations with the Americans concerns not only us and the Americans, but all the people in all the continents, who are worried about where this world is heading. And many have perhaps realised where it is heading. And it is this realisation that has made for concern which is shared today by people everywhere.

You have been effective participants in the Moscow summit these days: you have had many contacts between yourselves and with Soviet people and members of the world press.

I think this is precisely what you have sought — maintaining a real presence at the Moscow summit. I won't speak for the US President, for only he can do so. But I'll speak for myself and for the Soviet leadership. We thank you for having left off even the most urgent, most essential business in your countries and come to Moscow to set forth your positions.

Comrades Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and Dobrynin, who met with you earlier, have told me about those meetings and about your ideas, concerns and wishes to the Soviet Union and its leadership.

I don't know whether they have relayed to me everything that you told them, but I agree with

everything that they have, and with everything I have heard. It may be, though, that they have relayed only the positive comments? You made perhaps criticisms as well.

So as to fill in the gap and, most importantly, having learned of your desire to meet with me, I responded at once, although it is only now that an opportunity has presented itself. And I am glad to be having this meeting with you.

First of all, I'm glad to greet you here, in the Kremlin, sincerely, as a friend and as a person having profound respect and high appreciation for what you do.

Your presence here shows once again that the public today is fully determined to enter big-time politics. I personally find this determination appealing. I think your efforts important.

Moreover, your activity (and represented by you here is the entire, vast world with all its aspirations, hopes, plans and concerns) is a sign of the times in which we live and which are marked by real and direct participation by the peoples — and, in the first place, their more conscious, active part — in international affairs.

In the nuclear age when the price of a mistake in big-time politics has not just increased, but is nearing the absolute, the presence of world public opinion in these politics, too, has more to it than before.

I'd say that this is a powerful factor for having these politics filled with moral, humanist contents, and at the same time a guarantee that the policies won't divorce themselves from what they, in principle, are for — from people, from the concerns of their lives and from their interests.

I want to avail myself of this opportunity to thank you — and along with you all those who are not present here but have sent greetings, appeals and wishes in connection with the Moscow summit to the Soviet leadership and to me personally — to thank you sincerely. Such letters give us inspiration and support. Thank you very much indeed.

I hope that you know our view of the fourth meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the President of the United States. At any rate, yesterday we attempted forthwith,

right after the summit, to formulate this view at a news conference.

Without repeating the details, I would like to summarise the main points.

We have drawn the balance sheet for the entire process since Geneva and, separately, for what has been done since Washington. I believe we have not given ourselves up to euphoria or excessive optimism when describing the summit as a major international event which has consolidated the intense and difficult, yet most essential Soviet-American dialogue.

The dialogue has covered the most vital issues of concern to the Soviet and American people and to the peoples of all continents. We have not been able perhaps to discuss everything with due thoroughness, but considering the fact that since Geneva the dialogue has continued non-stop, I can tell you that as a result of the Moscow meeting we have gone a step or maybe two steps up — I don't know yet how many, but at any rate, it has been up the staircase.

The Soviet-US dialogue has been making progress, covering more and more problems and delving ever more deeply into them.

I'd say that all the time, with every further meeting, this dialogue has shown more realism, it has involved ever more real politics and ever less rhetoric, although we haven't been able to get rid of the latter completely this time as well. But we've still been able to subdue it markedly. And the trend to go in for real politics and pursue real dialogue has been growing ever stronger. I'm looking for the right words to express more precisely our understanding of the substance, thrust, scope and value of the Soviet-American dialogue.

The real achievements in every area of the agenda of the Soviet-American talks form the basis for further progress. I see the Moscow summit as having been highly significant in this respect as well.

It has made, in a way, for continuity in the difficult relay started by Geneva. On some of the issues — and they are pointed out in the joint statement — we have reached understanding as a result of the meeting and this understanding has been recorded on paper. As regards many of them, appropriate instructions have been given to ministers, delegations and experts, so they are, in a word, being delegated to the negotiators for an in-depth analysis so as to enable us eventually to reach further agreements.

I believe it very important that we have agreed to broaden ties in the field of science and culture and contacts between non-governmental and youth organisations and to jointly study various problems, including those related to human rights.

When the President was still here, it was easier for me in his presence to voice some views, including those on this issue. Now that he's gone, it is not too fitting, I believe, for me to do so, but I'll try to do this with a sense of responsibility.

My impression was that the President had come here with outdated positions on some of the issues, among which I'd include his views and judgements on human rights in the Soviet Union. This is point one.

And point two is that we had, for our part, decided to overcome the certain shyness and tact we had always showed when it came to human rights. We decided so because we had seen that it was harmful, that it did not only harm to us, but had also caused confusion in the minds of people everywhere. Many people are indeed asking: what is happening to people there, in the Soviet Union?

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## Trade and Economic Affairs

The two sides reconfirmed their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and noted recent activity in this area. They reiterated their belief that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations. They welcomed the results of the meeting of the joint USSR-US commercial commission in April and noted with satisfaction that working groups had been created under the commission to further the establishment of better conditions under which mutually advantageous trade can develop. Taking note of the 1974 joint statement and protocol amending the long-term agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to facilitate economic, industrial and technical co-operation issued at the conclusion of the joint commercial commission, they agreed that the commission should continue to meet to build upon the forward momentum which has been generated.

The two leaders cited expanding relations between Aeroflot and Pan-American airlines under the government-to-government civil air transportation agreement as a positive example of mutually beneficial co-operation.

## Consulates Exchange/Diplomatic and Consular Missions

The General Secretary and the President reaffirmed their agreement to open Consulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable.

The two leaders discussed questions relating to ensuring adequate and secure conditions for Soviet and US diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel in each other's territory. They agreed on the need to approach problems relating to such matters constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

## V Future Meetings

The General Secretary and the President, recognising the importance of their personal involvement in the development of relations in the months ahead, instructed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz to meet as necessary and to report to them on ways to ensure continued practical progress across the full range of issues. Expert-level contacts will also continue on an intensified basis. □

(Moscow, June 1, 1988)

We laid it out before the President in this way: I said I could not agree to his assessments of the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. The facts that are mentioned do take place. But they are not yet the full picture of the Soviet Union, of our society — a vast, complicated, interesting society which is, at that, living through a special period in its development.

And we advised the President to talk with our people so as to form his own, direct impression. And the President, to my mind, has been able to get some feel of it, although, naturally, the framework of the visit has limited his possibilities.

Besides, I told the President that we also have our own point of view on the human rights situation in American society and I named these problems and detailed them. The President then started debating the issue and looking for arguments to disprove my judgements.

But I said: Mr President, I won't, of course, insist on giving you the absolute truth. I'll emphasise only that I based my case on the data of American Congress, without even using facts supplied on this score by the American press. It is pointless to waste time now, so let's put this kind of discussion on a regular footing.

And I made this proposal: we maintain parliament-to-parliament contacts. So let's organise a standing seminar. You'll tell us your views in an expanded form. We'll give you our views on the human rights situation in American society. You'll inform us, we'll inform you and then we'll compare the information. This will help clear up the whole matter.

We will probably have an opportunity to exchange things positive that both countries have. This idea has been accepted, it has been reflected in the joint statement. We are open for discussion and are prepared for it.

We are far from portraying our country as being perfect in all respects. But I will tell you in the presence of Soviet people whom I see here: we take pride in our country, we have been rendering it habitable for centuries, we have been protecting it. We take joy in and take to heart everything that is taking place here, and now we have launched a profound process which we call perestroika. I don't understand whether there are so many of our people here, or representatives of other countries support the perestroika effort so much.

I said to the President: let us agree to respect each other and respect, above all, the choice of every nation. There might happen sometimes unjustified disrespect of one individual towards another, there might be causes of this attitude that are quite convincing. But, I think, we should never allow a situation under which relations among peoples in this complex world be based on anything other than respect for and trust in every nation, recognition of each people's right to make a choice — political, ideological, cultural and so on.

If there is no agreement on that, our relations cannot be changed for the better, the situation cannot be reversed. This is the starting point. We will go on with our work, as we understand it, proceeding from our values, our principles. We do not impose things that we are doing here on others. But we will not accept any instructions as to how we should conduct our affairs.

I think that disrespect is inadmissible, unacceptable not only among great nations and states. It is probably even more inadmissible with regard to small nations and nationalities.

We are inspired by our own goals. We do not need someone else's model, we do not need alien values. There are centuries behind our society. In two-three days we will celebrate the millennium of Christianity in Russia. Our Transcaucasian and Central Asian peoples have roots that go millennia deep. Can it be that all these peoples, having traversed such a historic path and having formed through hardships their

today's history, have failed to gain experience, do not possess the historic, scientific and intellectual potential necessary to perceive themselves, to understand their current state and develop in accordance with their society?

On this rests, if you want, our confidence that perestroika will ultimately triumph. We believe in the wisdom of the peoples living in our country. In the same way we recognise the right of every nation on Earth to handle their tasks in keeping with their values, with their notions about the world.

I made it a point to elaborate on this subject in the introductory statement: it is so important today to have respect, understanding, mutual understanding and equality. Because all the continents in the world are in motion, all peoples are searching for ways for a better life. Not to trust peoples, to suspect them of being unable to find their path is inadmissible. That is why we reject any instruction aimed at us, and are not going to instruct anyone ourselves. The world is not a school with teachers and pupils. Here, we are all pupils, while life and history are our teacher, our common teacher. History will show whose values are rated the highest. There can be no other criteria. This point is very important.

Moreover, we believe that the diversity of the world, the fact that we are different does not make this world worse. On the contrary, there is a chance to compare, to exchange and to borrow from one another anything that is suitable, anything that belongs to universal human values and achievements.

This is what I wanted to say to comment on the part of the Moscow summit that was concerned with this subject.

Now I want to invite you for a conversation. Who wants to take the floor? You are welcome.

*Forty four foreign participants in the meeting spoke out. Lively exchanges started up with some of them.*

*In conclusion, Mikhail Gorbachev said:*

When I arrived at the news conference yesterday, I started my statement with an apology to the press. I was late because a complicated situation emerged at the close of the talks with the President. We openly discussed major and significant issues. We confronted each other, then broke away, consulted and agreed . . . That wasn't easy. The desire was to complete that important meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union with greater positive results.

Indeed, this was hard. This is what I think today: how to cope with the difficulties at the end of our meeting. I knew how to begin it, but don't know how to conclude.

Nothing doing. We will succeed through concerted effort. I'll put aside for awhile the questions you have sent. I'll speak out and, in passing, will probably answer most of them.

First of all, I want to say I am very pleased with what has been happening here for these two odd hours. I like very much and I'm moved by the atmosphere of openness, cordiality and trust that prevail here and cement our relations in general. This is so important that I would place that the highest. So much has been piled up lately on the roads towards mutual understanding, on the roads towards rapprochement and co-operation, that it isn't so easy to pass through all these logjams to reach mutual understanding, respect and sympathy — to reach, ultimately, trust.

That is not easy. But our communication with President Reagan is an example of how people, far from one another for reasons of great differences in views — political, ideological and, perhaps, in cultural traditions, and also from the viewpoint of their experience and even age — realise that something must be done, an attempt must be made to advance towards one another. This means it is possible to find an answer to

general issues, that the emergence of elements of trust is possible. Who could say in 1985, when we were going to have our first meeting in Geneva, that we will cover such an immense path in these three years. This path is brief — merely three years, but by its content, by the changes that have occurred over that time, it is considerable.

If we all have admitted that we have common concerns, it is necessary to move towards one another, to speak openly, to set out arguments and display respect for the position of the interlocutor. In this case it is possible to attain great heights. Among them I single out trust, mutual understanding and compassion for the fate of all nations, for the fate of each nation. All that is very much needed today. The realities of our age are such that they, as a matter of fact, break traditional notions. We cannot preserve, the less so, to improve what has been accomplished without moving forward on the basis of new approaches and new notions that would be based on the present-day realities. It is necessary to discard the old stereotypes engendered by the cold war, by the alienation of peoples, and move on towards one another, while respecting each nation.

Some peoples are at one stage of historic development, other peoples, at another. Some belong to one system, others, to a different one. Some profess one religion, others, another. These are all realities. We all ought to understand them, and display tolerance and respect, for such is the community of people. This is the most important thing.

Is it messianism of some sort? Or is it real politics? I will tell you: when we have analysed our society, assessed its past and present, and came to the conclusion that this society must be restructured and renewed in the interests of people, when we looked at the world in which we live and at other countries, and transformed that into new thinking, on the basis of which we proposed our present-day policy and advanced a number of initiatives, we have been thinking all the time that precisely this approach must lie at the basis of real politics — both domestic and foreign. But as soon as we put that forward, we were accused of messianic dreams divorced from life, from reality.

The world is ripe for changes — the entire world, all countries. Why this interest in our perestroika, in our policy? It means that politics based on realities is needed. It means that these are not merely dreams, not just attractive plans. The world is simply tired of everything that has haunted it for as many as forty years. People have become mature for another kind of life and for change. There have emerged such imperatives in the world of today as the need to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, prevent ecological catastrophe and cope with poverty and diseases, backwardness and many other world problems. The entire civilisation has come to face the question: it is necessary to change mentality, to change the attitude towards the shaping of our today's world.

What you have said here is a tremendous support for us. It means that all this is really necessary for all of us. No matter how quilted and varicoloured and different in its development our world is — it is our single modern human civilisation of which we are links, interconnected particles of its single organism. I think we all are going through a big school in which we are jointly learning how to live in the present-day world. All that we have known before is important and valuable, but we need different knowledge, different approaches, we need a fresh view based on trust, we must openly look one another into the eyes.

I thank you for the understanding that was present at this meeting, understanding of the need to advance towards one another, understanding that the search for a better life, for

the best road to a better world is our common concern, the concern of all peoples.

We want to be participants in this joint work for the good of such an understanding, for the good of such a development of human and international relations. This is the first point.

It seems to me — and we have again seen this for ourselves here — that the millions of active supporters of the anti-nuclear movement, the anti-war movement, other progressive movements whose representatives took the floor here — they all are fully-fledged participants in international politics. I think that now it is no longer possible to formulate policy, given of course that it is a serious policy, without due account for the experience of the mass movements in all countries. In any case I personally am becoming increasingly convinced of this on the basis of what has taken place here during these three hours.

Peace is too serious a matter to put up with the monopoly of politicians, generals, diplomats and experts on foreign policy. I have no objections to this leitmotif of our meeting. I vote together with you for such an understanding, for such an approach, for such a view on this problem.

Friends, you have come to Moscow on the occasion of an event that concerns first of all the USSR and the United States. Your presence here underlines, of course, the importance of Soviet-American relations. But, if we give thought to it, another conclusion also stems from this: one should not look at the world only through the prism of Soviet-American relations. You, the people present in this hall, you represent the world, with its concerns, with its questions both to the United States and the Soviet Union. Another approach would contradict the realities of the modern world and, apparently, would have the smell of chauvinism of a sort of the great powers. The realities are such: there exist the United States, there exists the Soviet Union. But there also exists the unique Europe which has in its historical experience something, perhaps, that nobody else has and which at the same time constitutes a common weal. There exists the great Asia which is now in motion and looking for the road to its happy destiny. There exists Latin America which is straightening its stature and there is Africa which is accumulating a strength of its own. All these are mighty realities.

And if 10-15 years and the more so 20 years ago some people permitted themselves to ignore them, today a policy cannot be called a policy if it ignores these realities, such a policy is doomed. Indeed, our world is varicoloured and complex, saturated with big, diverse interests. So in our time only a policy that takes into account all the complexities of the world can be a correct one.

I would single out also the following. Today's discussion confirms my thoughts about something that caused me concern lately: politics

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have not been able to answer all the questions. There are so many of you willing to put a question. But I welcome your immense interest in the fourth Soviet-American summit and I thank you for your co-operation. Till we meet again.

The press conference was attended by Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Alexander Yakovlev, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Dmitri Yazov, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defence of the USSR, Anatoli Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Anatoli Chernyayev, Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. □

lag behind the advance of scientific and technological progress which advances, apart from everything else, also the development of armaments. While talks are under way new classes and types of weapons are appearing at the same time. Politics also lags behind what has already been realised by the huge masses, by millions of people, lags behind what should be translated into actual deeds and actually be present in politics.

The time factor today is becoming one of the most crucial ones. We all should take this into account. The slower the growth of awareness of what is taking place in our countries and in the world as a whole the greater the danger that we are lagging very much in politics. We might even find ourselves in an impasse from which it will be difficult to emerge. So I draw the conclusion for myself as a politician, and I think it is a correct conclusion, and also for you as representatives of a public movement — we should not lose time and we should act.

It appears that much has begun to change. This simply cannot be underestimated. Continents and peoples are in motion. But it would be a serious delusion, a mistake if we saw only this and did not see, did not notice, ignored processes which cause the concern of peoples, processes of a qualitative nature also by their scale. Take the arms race, take poverty and backwardness, mass diseases, ecological and other problems. They are mounting. For this reason the understanding which has appeared in all of us and which came into being on the basis of an analysis of the past and the present situation in which we find ourselves should be increasingly combined and linked with concrete actions. The same goes also for politicians. The same goes for public and political leaders, parties and movements.

Through the policy of perestroika, by implementing it we will ensure new approaches which include such an understanding of new realities.

In short, I am emphasising my second thought: time, the time factor is something that is running short both for politics and politicians, and, I would add, also for public movements. Therefore we should all have the conviction that we must act extremely actively.

I have already explained, particularly during the US President's visit here, how we, the Soviet leadership, see the world of the future. We perceive it as a world without nuclear weapons and violence. These will be the main features of this future world. For the sake of it we will act along all directions. As to disarmament, political dialogue, the solution of global problems, regional conflicts and problems of the third world in general — we are aware of our responsibility as well and will make a constructive contribution. I think you have sensed that we strive for our words, for our proclaimed policy to be followed by appropriate practical steps. This is the way in which we will act.

Many questions have been asked here, advice and suggestions have been offered, for instance, to give thought to some matters. There were also reminders that it is very important and desirable to return to the problem of stopping nuclear tests. It was said that it is necessary to advance the process of improvement in international relations along all directions, including, for instance, the Pacific region, South Asia. Incidentally, we are ardent supporters of the development in Asia and the Pacific of processes like those that are already under way in Europe and America.

We see that in its development civilisation is shifting towards the Pacific Ocean. The biggest states, associations there are emerging on the arena and, naturally, there are many problems there. That is a very complex world. We are far from suggesting that the experience of Europe should be mechanically applied there. But much of this experience could be analysed and used in

accordance with concrete conditions. Here, too, it is time to act.

When we proposed this (I made the first such attempt in my speech in Vladivostok) voices sounded: the Soviet Union, they alleged, is trying to muscle its way in here as well, it is pursuing selfish aims. No, our policy that I described in the Vladivostok speech is an invitation addressed to all states, peoples and governments of that region, an invitation to think, to search, to interact and to start making the first steps.

Not that much time has elapsed since then but we already can say that simply wonderful contacts have taken place as well as talks that were good in terms of content and scope. I refer both to my own meetings and the meeting of other representatives of the Soviet leadership with representatives of that huge region — with India, with China, with Japan, with the United States, with Australia, with ASEAN countries, with Indonesia, with Thailand — only recently we played host to the Prime Minister of that country — and with others.

I believe, therefore, that movement has begun. I have dwelt on this question specially because it was raised here. I want to say that you can count on our responsible and constructive contribution.

Many other interesting questions were raised. Perhaps some of them were answered in my concluding remarks while to other questions answers will be given in my subsequent speeches and in speeches by other representatives of the Soviet Union.

I thank you for your participation, your contribution to the importance of these days in Moscow. We appreciate this very much. We will give careful thought to everything that has been said here and took notes of everything.

I wish you all success. I would say, more initiative and vigour. May courage never leave you. Why am I speaking about courage? Because this is struggle and not just pleasant trips and conversations. This is struggle but struggle with the use of those means which you have and which we we also welcome, as well as the aims for which you are struggling.

I wish you all success and happiness. □

## Farewell ceremony in the Kremlin

AN official farewell ceremony for US President Ronald Reagan took place in the Kremlin on the morning of June 2 at the end of his official visit to the Soviet Union.

Addressing the distinguished American visitors, Mikhail Gorbachev thanked the US President and his colleagues for their co-operation, openness and a business-like approach to the talks.

The Soviet leader expressed the opinion that "there is every reason to regard this meeting and your visit as a useful contribution to the development of dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States".

He recalled that "from the first exchange of letters to the conclusion of this meeting we've come a long way. Our dialogue has not been easy. But we mastered enough realism and political will to overcome obstacles and divert the train of Soviet-US relations from a dangerous track to a safer one."

"Now, with the vast experience of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow and backed by their achievements, we are duty-bound to display still greater determination and consistency. That is what the Soviet and American peoples, international public opinion and the entire world community are expecting of us," Gorbachev said. □